FOREWORD TO “INCENTIVES AND INCOMPLETE
INFORMATION”
Claude d’Aspremont
It is a unique pleasure to contribute to this volume in honor of Bob Wilson,
my esteemed advisor, on the occasion of his 65th birthday. This contribution is
meant to be a token of admiration, gratitude and friendship. My good fortune
started in 1967, when Bob Wilson visited core for a year and left there a warm
and durable impression. As a student in Louvain University, I didn’t meet him
at the time, but had some knowledge of his articles since they were already much
quoted; however, when later I declared to my friends at core that I wanted to
do a ph.d. in the States, I was strongly advised (especially by my master-thesis
director, Jean Gabszewicz) to go to Stanford and work with Bob Wilson. This
is what I did, for my greatest happiness.
That the article I have chosen to put in this volume owes much to what
I, personally, have learned from Bob Wilson is clear. When I arrived in Stanford in 1970, I knew little about game theory, and nothing about games with
incomplete information. I had then the privilege to learn these topics (and others, such as social choice) in Bob Wilson’s wonderful classes and in the regular
interviews he was kind enough to give me. Most fascinating to me was his fundamental concern to explain, using a game-theoretic approach, how economic
institutions, and in particular markets, do work in practice. My co-author LouisAndré Gérard-Varet also had the privilege to receive Bob Wilson’s advice, as a
post-doctoral fellow at the imsss in 1974–1975. The beneﬁt for us both of this
enlightened learning came soon, when back to core I was hired, together with
Louis-André Gérard-Varet, on a Belgian State research contract devoted to the
economic analysis of transboundary pollution.1 It is in this context that we
read a report by an oecd scientist (Smets, 1973) who was proposing to replace
the often advocated Polluters-Pay-Principle by a ‘Principle of Reciprocal Compensation’ (equivalent to what was to be called later a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves
mechanism, and thus implying outcome eﬃciency and incentive compatibility in
dominant strategies), and who formulated very clearly the problem of balancing
the agency budget. It was only natural, after receiving from Bob Wilson a perfect training on “modeling incomplete information” (the title of notes prepared
1 Bob Rosenthal, who was Bob Wilson’s ﬁrst doctoral student, also contributed to this
contract, while a visitor at core.
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by him for his class), to recognize that the strategic revelation of damage and
abatement costs generates a game with incomplete information. This triggered
our ﬁrst result for this contract (Theorem 6 in the present article): if utility is
fully transferable and beliefs are “independent” (or “free”), one can construct
a mechanism which is Bayesian incentive compatible (bic), outcome eﬃcient,
and budget balancing.2
But, the present article means much more to me than the publicity given to
this result. It is the ﬁrst visible output of a long-term project that I worked on
in close collaboration with my friend Louis-André Gérard-Varet until his death
in January 2001. In this long-term perspective, the main contribution of the
article is the formulation, for the transferable utility case, of the direct revelation
problem as a system of linear inequalities, to be solved in the transfers while
taking some eﬃcient decision rule as given, and the application to this system of
the “theorem of the alternative.” This is how the “compatibility condition” is
derived as another suﬃcient condition on the beliefs (Theorem 7), much weaker
than the independence condition. As we show in a recent paper,3 jointly written
with Jacques Crémer, the compatibility condition as deﬁned here is close to be
the weakest condition.4 This weakest condition is now known to hold generically,
and to be necessary and suﬃcient to ensure that any bic mechanism can be
transformed into a bic mechanism that balances the budget.
However large the eﬀorts represented by this whole set of results are, they
have to be complemented by others in the direction so well developed in the work
of Bob Wilson, since here only direct revelation mechanisms are investigated.
Indeed, as he tells us,5 “it suﬃces in principle to study direct revelation games in
order to ﬁnd eﬃcient trading rules.” However: “There often remains a motive,
of course, to translate an eﬃcient direct revelation game back into a form of the
2 This result was ﬁrst presented at the Belgian-Israeli Conference in Jerusalem in 1975 (see
core dp 7519). However, the references at the end of the present article are incomplete. The
same result is derived in Arrow K. J. (1979) “The Property Rights Doctrine and Demand Revelation Under Incomplete Information” in Economics and Human Welfare: Essays in Honor
of Tibor Scitovsky, ed. by M. J. Boskin, New-York: Academic Press, and in d’Aspremont,
C. and L.-A. Gérard-Varet (1975) “Incentive Games with Incomplete Information: An Application to a Public Input Model” in Colloque International de Théorie des Jeux, Institut des
Hautes Etudes de Belgique.
3 d’Aspremont, C., J. Crémer, and L.-A. Gérard-Varet, 2002, “Balanced Bayesian Mechanisms,” mimeo, core.
4 In the notation of the present article this condition becomes: there is no λ ∈ Λ such


that, ∀i ∈ N , ∀α ∈ A, pi (α−i |αi ) ai =αi λi (ai , αi ) = κ(α) + ai =αi λi (αi , ai )pi (α−i |ai ),
whenever κ = 0. It is identical to the compatibility condition except for a permutation of
αi with ai in the left-hand-side λi ’s, and can be immediately derived from Theorem 7. This
variant of the compatibility condition was introduced (without mentioning the diﬀerence) in
d’Aspremont C. and L.-A. Gérard-Varet (1982): “Bayesian Incentive Compatible Beliefs,”
Journal of Mathematical Economics, 10, 83–103. An example showing the diﬀerence was
constructed by Johnson S., J. W. Pratt, and R. J. Zeckhauser (1990): “Eﬃciency despite
mutually payoﬀ-relevant private information: the ﬁnite case,” Econometrica, 58, 873–900,
who deﬁne an equivalent condition (link).
5 Wilson, R. B. (1985) “Eﬃcient Trading” in Issues of Contemporary Microeconomics and
Welfare, ed. by G. Feiwel, Albany: State University of New York Press, p. 183.
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sort more usually found in practice.” As he explained further, although direct
revelation mechanisms use the simplest kind of equilibrium (truth-telling), they
are complicated, since their rules integrate speciﬁc features of the economic
environment such as the participants information structure; in practice, trading
rules are more simple (e.g. independent of the number of participants and of
their beliefs), and the complexity is shifted to the equilibrium strategies, to be
computed by the participants themselves on the basis of their knowledge of the
economic environment.

